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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
assets of every kind and nature of the * * * defendants, derived by
means-of fraudulent acts,,practices or transactions in the sate of securi-
ties * -* * and liquidate same or any part thereof for the benefit of all
persons * * * ". From the language of the order it. is to be seen that
the powers of the appointed receiver were limited. The receivership,
which is contemplated by the Chandler Act 4 to constitute an act of
bankruptcy, is one where the powers of the receiver are unlimited and
general in their scope. There has to be a complete liquidation of all
the property of the bankrupt, and, in substance, should amount to a
general assignment of the assets.5
J. A. S.
CIVIL SERVICE-EXAMINATION FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSUR-
ANCE REFEREE-AsSIGNMENT OF RELATIVE WEIGHT TO WRITTEN
EXAMINATION-ExCLUDING LAWYER APPLICANTS WHO ARE NOT
GRADUATES OF LAW ScHoOLs.-Petitioners are lawyers who were
admitted to the Bar under rules authorized by statute' and rules
promulgated by the Court of Appeals.2 Each have had at least five
.years' experience in active practice. The State Industrial Commis-
si6ner was authorized to appoint "subject to the regulations of the
civil service" as many unemployment insurance referees as might be
necessary to perform the prescribed duties under the law.3 Accord-,
4 See note I supra.
5 Burns v. Maguire, 255 App. Div. 552, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 313 (lst Dept.
1938), aff'd, 280 N. Y. 700, 21 N. E. (2d) 203 (1939). An action brought by a
receiver appointed under the Martin Act (see note 1, mcpra) was dismissed
because the receiver failed to allege that the cause of action arose out of fraudu-
lent practice; since the receiver was not a "general receiver"; he could not
maintain the action without such an allegation. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of this case upon the authority of Goldberg, et al. v. Weiinian,
et at., 247 App. Div. 734, 277 N. Y. Supp. 657 (2d Dept. 1935), aff'd, 269 N. Y.
537, 199 N. E. 524 (1935).. Plaintiff in this case was appointed receiver pur-
suant to the Martin Act; he sued for an accounting and damages were alleged
to have been sustained through the mismanagement of the directors of the corpo-
ration. The court held that the acts complained of did not affect the property
of the corporation since such assets were derived by means of the fraudulent
practices denounced by the Act. Therefore plaintiff had no legal capacity to
sue. Hughes v. Ellenbogen, 256 App. Div. 1103, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 561 (2d
Dept. 1939) (the scope of the receivership, contemplated under the Martin Act,
is limited to such property as derived by means of fraudulent practices and does
not extend to general assets). See People v. Lother, 241 App. Div. 524, 273
N. Y. Supp. 669 (4th Dept. 1934).
S1 N. Y. JuD. LAW § 53.
2 N. Y. CT. OF App. RULES FOR ADMISSION OF ATTys. III, IV.
3 N. Y. LABOR LAW §§ 518 (6a), 530 '(The statutory duties of an unem-
ployment insurance referee are defined as follows: "It shall be the duty of a
referee, under the supervision, direction and administrative control of the appeal
board, to hear and decide disputed claims for benefits, to hear and decide cases
arising under section five hundred twenty-three hereof and to conduct further
hearings in connection with the foregoing, as may be required by the appeal
board").
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ingly, there was published a notice of examination 4 of candidates for
vacancies existing in the position of unemployment insurance referee
in the competitive class. Petitioners filed applications which were
rejected by the Civil Service Commission as not fulfilling the minimum
requirements. Petitioners also applied to the Commission for a revi-
sion of the minimum requirements, but the application was denied. In
spite of many protests forthcoming from the various Bar associations
and individual members of the legal profession the Commission con-
ducted the examination. Petitioners thereupon brought proceedings
under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Act for an order
directing the cancellation of the examination, and for a revision of the
minimum requirements on the grounds that the requirements set forth
in the notice of examination were arbitrary, capricious and unreason-
able, and further, that they were discriminatory as against lawyers
who were not graduates of recognized law schools. Held, in favor of
petitioners.5 Matter of Cowen, et aL. v. Reavy, et at., 283 N. Y. 232,
28 N. E. (2d) 390 (1940).
The courts will not disturb the actions of the Civil Service Com-
mission or of other administrative bodies, even though they may differ
as to the wisdom or propriety of their acts, unless such acts are pal-
4 The minimum qualifications set forth by the public notice may be sum-
marized as follows:(a) Applicants who are high school graduates and who have six
years' full-time, paid employment (at least two years in a supervisory or
administrative capacity) in one of the following:
1. Positions in the placement or personnel office of a business
or labor organization or an employment agency.
2. Positions involving management or direction of a large staff
of personnel
3. Positions in the Workmen's Compensation Bureau.
4. Positions in a public or private agency dealing with compli-
ance with labor laws or labor agreements.
5. Positions involving settling insurance claims.(b) Applicants who are college graduates and have four years of
the experience listed in (a) (at least one year in a supervisory or admin-
istrative capacity).(c) Applicants who are graduates from a recognized school of law,
who are admitted to the Bar and have had at least five years' experience
in active practice of the law, including or supplemented by the following
specialized experience:
1. One year full-time paid employment in one of the positionsdescribed in (a), which must have been in an administrative or super-
visory capacity, or
2. Two years' satisfactory full-time experience in a public
agency or civic organization in drafting legislation, or in formulating
rules of procedure affecting contested claims, or3. Two years' satisfactory full-time, paid employment in the
active conduct of labor or workmen's compensation cases, or
4. Two years' experience with a government agency as arbi-
trator or referee.
5In considering the minimum requirements prescribed in group "(c)",
subds. 1, 2, 3, 4 of the notice of examination in their relation to the prescribed
statutory duties, the majority of the court said: "Mindful of these requirements
which partake of the judicial function, it is difficult to state a reason why admis-
1940)
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
pably illegal.6 It is the function of the Civil Service Commission to
fix a fair and reasonable standard by which may be tested the qualifi-
cations of applicants for appointment to the civil service. The exer-
cise of that function may be the subject of judicial review only in the
event of a clear showing that in fixing the test of fitness the action by
the Commission was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. 7  The
constitution provides for appointments and promotions in the civil
service according to merit and fitness to be ascertained by examina-
tions which, so far as practicable, shall be competitive.8 An examina-
tion is not competitive merely because it is so denominated. The sub-
stance, not merely the form of a competitive examination, is required. 9
A test or examination to be competitive must employ objective stand-
ards, and thus, where the standards are wholly subjective to the exam-
iners, it differs in no material respect from the uncontrolled opinion of
the examiners and cannot be regarded as competitive.-' Although
sion to the Bar, followed by five years of active practice of the law, would not
be sufficient as a qualification for the performance of those duties. We cannot
say, as a matter of law, however, upon the present record, that the additional
minimum qualifications set forth as alternatives in group '(c)', subds 1, 2, 3,
and 4, of the commission's notice of examination, are unreasonable The ques-
tion of the reasonableness of such additional qualifications is, in the circum-
stances present here, one of fact and should be made the subject of proof at
Special Term."
6 Allaire v. Knox, 62 App. Div. 29, 70 N. Y. Supp. 845 (1st Dept. 1901),
aff'd, 168 N. Y. 642, 61 N. E. 1127 (1901); People ex rel. Schau v. McWilliams,
185 N. Y. 92, 77 N. E. 785 (1906); Simmons v. McGuire, 204 N. Y. 253, 97
N. E. 526 (1912) ; People ex rel. Moriarty v. Creelman, 206 N. Y. 570, 100
N. E. 446 (1912); People ex rel. N. Y. & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 219 N. Y.
84, 113 N. E. 795 (1916) (involving a determination made by the Public Service
Commission); People ex rel. Braisted v. McCooey, 100 App. Div. 240, 91 N. Y.
Supp. 436 (1st Dept. 1905) ; People ex rel. Caridi v. Creelman, 150 App. Div.
746, 135 N. Y. Supp. 718 (1st Dept. 1912); Bridgman v. Cosse, 157 Misc. 8,
283 N. Y. Supp. 226 (1935), aff'd, 246 App. Div. 632, 283 N. Y. Supp. 765 (2d
Dept. 1935), aff'd, 271 N. Y. 535, 2 N. E. (2d) 682 (1936).
7 Story v. Craig, 231 N. Y. 33, 131 N. E. 560 (1921) ; Barthelmess v. Cukor,
231 N. Y. 435, 132 N. E. 140 (1921) ; Scahill v. Drzewucki, 269 N. Y. 343, 199
N. E. 506 (1936) ; Fink v. Finegan, 270 N. Y. 356, 1 N. E. (2d) 462 (1936)
(the giving of a non-competitive test for the position of medical examiner in
order to determine the fitness and executive ability of the applicants was an
abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission) ; Andresen v. Rice, 277 N. Y.
271, 14 N. E. (2d) 65 (1938) ; People ex rel. Sweeney v. Rice, 279 N. Y. 70,
17 N. E. (2d) 772 (1938) ; Schwab v. McElligott, 282 N. Y. 182, 26 N. E. (2d)
10 (1940); Kelty v. Kaplan, 205 App. Div. 487, 199 N. Y. Supp. 337 (2d Dept.
1923) (the correctness of classification of a, position by the Commission is
subject to review, and mandamus will lie to correct an improper classification) ;
Ryan v. Finegan, 166 Misc. 548, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 10 (1937), aff'd, 253 App. Div.
713, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 643"(1st Dept. 1937) (in which the Municipal Civil Service
Commission set an arbitrary age limit of twenty-five years for the position of
Clerk, Grade 2.
8 N. Y. CoxsT. art. V, § 6; Marcellus v. Kern, 170 Misc. 280, 10 N. Y. S.
(2d) 73 (1939).
9 Barthelmess v. Cukor, 231 N. Y. 435, 132 N. E. 140 (1921) ("The test is
not merely examination. The test is competitive examination"); Barlow v.
Berry, 245 N. Y. 500, 157 N. E. 834 (1927); Sloat v. Board of Examiners of
the Board of Education, 274 N. Y. 367, 9 N. E. (2d) 12 (1937).
20 Sheridan v. Kern, 255 App. Div. 57, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 336 (1st Dept.
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objective examination is not always possible, tests should be reason-
ably calculated to show merit and fitness and not merely unfettered
preferences or judgment of the examiners. These principles, stated
in relation to the examination itself, apply with equal force to the
standards which are prescribed to be fulfilled as a condition to taking
it. It is, therefore, apparent that, if such standards are unreasonable,
or if arbitrary or discriminatory limitations are placed upon those per-
mitted to take the examination, the test fails to assume the competitive
form and is violative of the competitive principle. The courts, upon
proof of such abuse of discretion, can require postponement or direct
the cancellation of the examination and order the revision of the
requirements to conform to the standards of reasonableness and pro-
priety.11 In the instant case, the court found the quality of reason-
ableness lacking in the action of the Commission in assigning a rela-
tive weight of only 40% to the written examination and giving a
weight of 60%o to "training, experience and general qualifications".12
In addition, the court held that the requirement of graduation from a
recognized law school is an unreasonable and arbitrary discrimination
against the lawyer who is not a graduate from a recognized law school,
but who may have qualified in New York as attorney and counsellor
at law under the rules authorized by statute 13 and rules promulgated
by the Court of Appeals.14
P.C.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAV-FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF RELIGION
-FOURTEENTH AmENDMENT.-Newton Cantwell and his two sons,
Jesse and Russell, members of a religious group known as Jehovah's
Witnesses, were convicted of violating Section 6294 of the General
Statutes of Connecticut.' They, in the course of distributing per-
1938) (Wherein the Civil Service Commission granted preference to applicants
for the position of Social Investigator who had had experience with the Emer-
gency Relief Bureau by giving more credit to such applicants for experience and
college training than to employees of private agencies in grading the examina-
tion. The court held such act improper and directed regrading).
13 Matter of Keymer, 148 N. Y. 219, 42 N. E. 667 (1896); Barthelmess v.
Cukor, 231 N. Y. 435, 132 N. E. 140 (1921) ; Barlow v. Berry, 245 N. Y. 500,
157 N. E. 834 (1927); Mendelson v. Kern, 278 N. Y. 568, 16 N. E. (2d) 106(1938); People ex rel. Sweeney v. Rice, 279 N. Y. 70, 17 N. E. (2d) 772(1938); Sheridan v. Kern, 255 App. Div. 57, 5 N. Y. S. (2dj 336 (1st Dept.
1938).
12 The court said: "The mandate for competition becomes futile when as
here, we find that a candidate's 'general qualifications'-wholly subjective to the
examiners and unappraised by objective standards of any kind-are made a test
of fitness and, with training and experience, are given a rating weight of 60%."13 See note 1, mipra.
14 See note 2, supra.
I "No person shall solicit money, services, subscriptions or any valuable
thing for any alleged religious, charitable or philanthropic cause, from other
than a member of the organization for whose benefit such person is soliciting or
within the county in which such person or organization is located unless such
1940 ]
